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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to contribute to explaining diﬀerences in aggregate productivity
between similar, industrialized countries such as the US and European Union (EU) member
states. By introducing shifts in administrative entry cost and a ﬁrm technology adoption de-
cision in a model of heterogeneous ﬁrms close to Hopenhayn (1992), it matches the following
facts: higher entry cost is associated with (1) both lower labor and total factor productivity,
(2) more capital-intensive production, and (3) lower ﬁrm turnover. Compared to previous
studies of reallocation intensity and aggregate productivity, endogenizing capital intensity
through technology choice leads to stronger results; higher equilibrium capital intensity acts
as an entry barrier to new ﬁrms, and protects low-productivity incumbents. Notably, the very
small diﬀerences in the administrative cost of entry as documented by Djankov, La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) suﬃce to explain 10 to 20% of diﬀerences in TFP and
the capital-output ratio between Europe and the US. To obtain this, both heterogeneity of
ﬁrms and allowing for technology choice are crucial.
JEL codes: E22, G38, L11, L16, O33, O40
Keywords: growth theory, aggregate productivity, technology adoption, ﬁrm dynamics, entry
and exit, reallocation, selection, regulation of entry
1 Introduction
The lag of Euro Area countries in labor and total factor productivity (TFP) relative to the
Unites States is a topic of ongoing discussion in Europe, reﬂected in political projects (e.g. the
Lisbon Agenda), commission reports (e.g. the Sapir Report 2004), and many academic papers
(e.g. Blanchard 2004, Prescott 2004). What is stressed less often is that whereas Europe lags
in these measures, in working hours, and in many measures of human capital, its economies
∗I would like to thank Omar Licandro, Morten Ravn, Jaume Ventura, and seminar participants at the EUI,
Pompeu Fabra University, and the EDP Jamoboree Florence 2005 for valuable comments and suggestions.
†Contact: European University Institute, Economics Department, Via della Piazzuola 43, 50133 Firenze, Italy.
e-mail: markus.poschke@iue.it. Tel. +39-348-7701271, Fax +39-055-4685-902.
1Table 1: Country statistics, 5 large EU economies and US
Firm turnover Administrative
rate entry cost Y/L K/Y
Germany 0.13 0.325 0.82 1.25
France 0.195 0.355 0.82 1.19
Italy 0.165 0.448 0.83 1.13
Netherlands 0.175 0.308 0.81 1.12
United States 0.22 0.017 1.00 1.00
Labor productivity (output per worker) and capital-output ratios are from Hall and Jones (1999). They are for
1988 and are expressed in PPP terms, relative to the US values. Firm turnover rates are the sum of average
annual ﬁrm entry and exit rates over the 1990s and are from Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2004). The
administrative cost of entry is the sum of direct payments and the cost of time spent on the procedure needed to
establish a small business. It is expressed as a fraction of the country’s per capita output and is from Djankov
et al. (2002).
are much more capital intensive. While this could simply be attributed to relatively higher
taxes on labor compared to capital and to stricter labor market regulation,1 there is more to it:
This paper shows that in a model of heterogeneous ﬁrms that adopt a technology upon entry,
a small shift in administrative entry cost equivalent to those reported by Djankov, La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) – corresponding to a small fraction of the total cost of
the entry investment – can explain part of the diﬀerences in TFP, capital-output ratios, and
turnover observed between European countries and the US. The eﬀect largely arises because the
equilibrium with higher administrative entry cost features a higher equilibrium investment at
entry. This acts as an entry barrier, and protects low-productivity incumbents. The paper hence
complements empirical studies on productivity and ﬁrm dynamics, and explores the implications
of their results for the macro level. From a policy point of view, the analysis here complements
recent theoretical and empirical work such as Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and Nicoletti and
Scarpetta (2003) that stresses productivity eﬀects of product and labor market regulation.
Table 1 summarizes data on labor productivity (measured as output per worker), capital-
output ratios, administrative cost of entry, and ﬁrm turnover rates for the US and major EU
economies. A salient feature of these indicators, stable over time and over measures of labor
productivity, is that European labor productivity is below its US counterpart, despite higher
1It is well known that labor taxes in most European countries are higher than in the US; for an illustration
of their impact see e.g. Prescott (2004). Moreover, eﬀective tax rates on capital tend to be lower in European
countries compared to the US (Chen, Mintz and Poschmann 2005). Stricter labor market regulation in Europe is
well-documented, see e.g. Blanchard (2004) and references therein. All these factors should induce substitution
towards more capital-intensive production in Europe.
2capital-output ratios. As many papers have remarked, this must be due to diﬀerences in TFP,
since diﬀerences in human capital are smaller than this gap (see e.g. Klenow and Rodriguez-
Clare 1997, Hall and Jones 1999, Caselli 2005). As these countries are similarly developed, these
TFP diﬀerences should not arise from diﬀerences in access to production technologies. Another
stable feature is that Euro Area countries feature systematically higher administrative entry
costs and systematically lower ﬁrm turnover rates than the US. Matching these patterns and
evaluating the impact of small changes in administrative entry costs on aggregate productivity
is the objective of this paper.
Any model used for addressing these aims needs to incorporate entry and exit, and, as
shown below, ﬁrm heterogeneity. The importance of these processes has been stressed in the
burst of empirical literature on the topic published in the last decade.2 For example, Dwyer
(1996) ﬁnds that productivity diﬀers by a factor 3 between establishments in the 9th and the
2nd decile of the productivity distribution in the US textile sector. Foster, Haltiwanger and
Krizan (2001) ﬁnd that in the Census of Manufactures, more than a quarter of the increase in
aggregate productivity between 1977 and 1987 was due to entry and exit. This is even more
pronounced in the retail sector, as they ﬁnd in their (2002) paper. The fact that this is the
sector where the productivity divergence between Europe and the US is strongest (van Ark,
Inklaar and McGuckin 2002) again suggests a role for ﬁrm dynamics. To take these insights
into account, the model used matches many features of ﬁrm dynamics, by construction or by
calibration.
Moreover, this paper introduces entrants’ technology choice in a dynamic stochastic hetero-
geneous-ﬁrm model building on Hopenhayn (1992), thereby endogenizing part of the underlying
productivity process aﬀecting ﬁrms. This is the contribution of this paper from a modeling
point of view. It is clear from the importance of entry and exit for aggregate productivity that
entrants’ choice of technology can have a large impact on aggregate productivity. Yet, existing
heterogeneous-ﬁrm models such as Jovanovic (1982), Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), and
Samaniego (2005) exogenously endow ﬁrms with a technology upon entry and then have their
productivity evolve stochastically.3 This restricts the changes of the productivity distribution
2Some extensive surveys of methods and results on ﬁrm-level dynamics for developed and developing countries
are Baldwin (1995), Roberts and Tybout (1996), Sutton (1997), Haltiwanger (1997), Caves (1998), Foster, Halti-
wanger and Krizan (2001, 2002), Bartelsman and Doms (2000), Tybout (2000), Scarpetta, Hemmings, Tressel
and Woo (2002), Bartelsman et al. (2004), and references therein.
3An exception is Ericson and Pakes (1995). They address technology choice by allowing ﬁrms to inﬂuence
their productivity by investments with a stochastic outcome. Though very rich, their model is also quite complex,
therefore hard to aggregate, and thus more easily applied at a more disaggregated level.
3that can arise; the formulation chosen here allows richer results.
Technology choice is modeled by letting entrants irreversibly choose a parameter determining
expected productivity. After entry, a ﬁrm’s productivity follows a Markov process that depends
on this parameter.4 The cost of the sunk entry investment is increasing and convex in the ex-
pected productivity of the technology chosen. Stochastically evolving ﬁrm productivity, optimal
choice of technology at entry, and endogenous exit of unproﬁtable ﬁrms then yield a stationary
distribution of ﬁrms over productivity levels. So, although ﬁrms constantly enter, exit, and
change position within the distribution, the distribution itself and other aggregate variables do
not change.
This stationary equilibrium of the model is calibrated to the US business sector, using static
and dynamic moments of its ﬁrm distribution. Calibration allows imputing the parameters of
the unobservable entry cost function (for a particular choice of functional form) and thereby
makes comparative dynamics exercises possible.
The empirical contribution of the paper lies in the evaluation of the eﬀect of small diﬀerences
in administrative entry cost. These are modeled as a shift of the entry cost function by a constant
for all technologies. Their eﬀect is obtained by comparing stationary equilibria. It results that
output loss exceeds the direct additional entry cost signiﬁcantly already for small administrative
entry costs such as those described in detail by Djankov et al. (2002). This is due to two eﬀects:
On the one hand, ﬁrms adopt better technologies in the new equilibrium, implying a larger entry
investment and more capital-intensive production. On the other hand, high capital intensity
acts as an entry barrier (an idea often found in the Industrial Organization literature, but rarely
endogenized as here), depresses the number of ﬁrms, and allows less eﬃcient ﬁrms to survive,
reducing labor productivity and TFP. Numerically, it turns out that the second eﬀect dominates,
so output per capita falls. These results correspond to the patterns observed when comparing
European countries to the US. Quantitatively, the reaction to an increase in the entry cost by
less than ten percent of median ﬁrm output, and around one percent of average ﬁrm output, is
suﬃcient for explaining 10 to 20% of diﬀerences in TFP and the capital-output ratio between
Germany and the US.
Finally, it is shown that both technology choice and ﬁrm heterogeneity are needed to generate
these results. In particular, without heterogeneity, it is hard to explain why there is so much
4Empirical research stresses ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks as the main driver of ﬁrm level dynamics. Their importance
can be inferred from the fact that rates of turnover diﬀer across industries, but tend to be similar across countries
for a given industry. Moreover, productivity diﬀerences within exceed those between industries (Foster et al.
2001). Within industries, Dhrymes (1991) and Dwyer (1996) ﬁnd productivity levels to diﬀer strongly even when
technology used and the environment are very close, underlining the importance of ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks.
4entry in the data, despite high entry costs and very high exit rates for young ﬁrms.
To summarize, the contribution of this paper is to trace part of the diﬀerence in aggregate
productivity between similarly developed economies to diﬀerences in administrative entry cost,
while also matching qualitative patterns of relative capital-output ratios and ﬁrm turnover rates.
This is particularly relevant in the light of the current European debate about its productivity
lag with respect to the US, and about the possible role of regulation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the economy and characterizes optimal
ﬁrm behavior. In section 3, an equilibrium for this economy is deﬁned, a proof is sketched, and
a solution algorithm outlined. (Formal statements of results and proofs are provided in the
Appendix.) In section 4, the model is calibrated to the US business sector. The eﬀect of raising




The economy consists of a continuum of measure ¯ N of workers, of a continuum of active ﬁrms
of endogenous measure µ, and of an unlimited pool of potential entrants. Active ﬁrms are
indexed by i. Firms are risk-neutral and maximize the discounted value of expected proﬁts. All
individuals in the economy own equal shares in all ﬁrms; proﬁts are redistributed to them.
Timing is as follows. Time is discrete and the horizon inﬁnite. In every period, the following
events and actions occur. All active ﬁrms pay a ﬁxed operating cost, and then learn their new
productivity level. Based on this, they choose output and employment, and the wage adjusts to
clear the labor market. Firms also decide whether they will be active next period; i.e. incumbents
decide whether to exit and potential entrants whether to enter. Firms that decide to enter choose
a technology. They then receive a draw from the distribution of entrants’ productivity at the
start of the next period.
Production entails a strictly positive ﬁxed operating cost cf per period.5 Active ﬁrms then
sell their output at a constant price normalized to 1. They produce according to the stochastic
production function
qit = f(sit,nit), (1)
5A ﬁxed cost is necessary to ensure positive exit; otherwise instead of exiting, ﬁrms could cut production to
zero and wait for better times. It can also be thought of as the cost of foregoing an outside option.
5where sit denotes the realization at time t of the stochastic process driving its productivity,
and nit the amount of labor it employs at time t. f(·) has standard properties summarized in
Assumption 1.
Assumption 1 f(·) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable and strictly increasing in both argu-
ments. It is concave in n. Moreover, an Inada condition holds, i.e. limn→0 fn(·) = ∞, and
limn→∞ fn(·) = 0.6 The cross-derivatives of employment with the productivity state, fns(·), is
positive.
The production technology thus has decreasing returns at the ﬁrm level. As a consequence, ﬁrm
size is a well-deﬁned concept, and a ﬁrm size distribution arises.
Employment nit can be adjusted costlessly every period. Firms hire labor on a competitive
labor market. Denote aggregate labor demand by Nt. Neither the model nor results are much
aﬀected by labor supply elasticity, so assume that labor supply is inelastic at ¯ N. Then the wage
ωt is a function of aggregate labor demand only.
The idiosyncratic productivity shock s follows a ﬁrst-order Markov process. Speciﬁcally,
assume that
Assumption 2 sit follows an AR(1) process with ﬁrm-speciﬁc constant vi:
sit = vi + ρsi,t−1 + it, 0 < ρ < 1, (2)
where  is distributed normally with mean zero and variance σ2 > 0. It is independent both
across ﬁrms and over time.
Here, think of vi ∈ R+ as the technology that ﬁrm i operates; it determines expected lifetime
productivity. Because ρ < 1, sit is stationary and mean-reverting. Denote the p.d.f. of sit
for a given vi conditional on si,t−1 by gvi(st|st−1) and its conditional distribution function by
Gvi(st|st−1). Moreover, a ﬁrm’s production facilities break down with an exogenous probability
δ, forcing the ﬁrm to exit. This ingredient is necessary to ﬁt the fact that although empirically,
the exit hazard is higher for small plants, there are still some large plants that exit.
Entrants that start producing in period t and have technology vi draw their initial produc-
tivity s0
t from a p.d.f. hvi(s0). For concreteness, suppose
Assumption 3 s0 ∼ N(¯ s0, σ2
e), with ¯ s0 = κ vi
1−ρ, and κ,σ2
e > 0.
6Derivatives of functions of several variables are indicated by subscripts.
6The constant κ serves to calibrate entrants’ relative to incumbents’ productivity, while vi is
entrants’ choice variable. From period t+1 on, entrants follow the process (2). Among surviving
ﬁrms there is a selection eﬀect: since low-productivity ﬁrms exit to avoid the ﬁxed operating cost,
average productivity is higher than implied by the asymptotic mean of (2). Hence, Assumption 3
implies that entrants expect to start with a realization of their productivity state below average
productivity of incumbents, unless κ is much larger than 1. As a consequence, young ﬁrms are
more likely to exit, and the hazard rate declines in age. Hence, by Assumptions 2 and 3, the
structure of the productivity process captures the features of persistence and mean reversion of
productivity, learning/selection, low productivity of entrants, and declining hazard rates found
in the data (see e.g. the surveys by Caves 1998, Bartelsman and Doms 2000).
The ﬁnal element to specify is entrants’ technology choice. Due to Assumptions 2 and 3,
technology vi determines expected productivity over a ﬁrms’ lifetime. Concretely, for any v0 and
v with v0 > v, the unconditional distribution functions gv0(s) and hv0(s0) ﬁrst-order stochastically
dominate gv(s) and hv(s0), respectively.
Technology vi is irreversibly chosen upon entry at a cost given by the entry investment
function ce(vi). This function gives the investment ce (in units of output) that a ﬁrm has to
make to enter the market with technology vi. Ruling out a scrap value of the ﬁrm on exit,
this investment is irreversible and sunk. Moreover, the menu of technologies available and the
associated costs do not change over time.
The shape of ce(vi) is governed by the following assumption.
Assumption 4 The entry investment cost function ce(v) is positive for all v and strictly in-
creasing and convex in v.
This assumption is needed to ensure that an equilibrium with choice of a ﬁnite level of technology
exists. (Exact conditions are given in Proposition 7 in the Appendix.) Intuitively, the entry
investment cost function must have such a shape that the marginal cost of a better technology
exceeds its marginal value from some v on. Since ﬁrm value is increasing in v (shown below),
the cost function also has to be increasing, and steeper than the value function from some v
on. Later, an exponential speciﬁcation is chosen for tractability; it is simple enough to make its
parameters identiﬁable just from calibration.
Assumption 4 allows several economic interpretations. The production technology is embod-
ied in a ﬁxed factor that ﬁrms acquire upon entry. Now it could be that there are information
costs about this factor that increase in its eﬃciency; or the life cycle of the technology could
7matter, with less competition in more advanced, younger products; or there could be decreasing
returns in the production of the technology.
Optimal choice of technology also means that the technological frontier is endogenous in this
model. While a little more advanced technologies are available, adopting them is not optimal,
while the prohibitive cost of much more advanced technologies can be seen as equivalent to
non-availability.
The last missing element of the description of the economy is the ﬁrm distribution. To track
ﬁrms’ cross-sectional distribution, deﬁne µt(v,s) as the mass of ﬁrms that have technology v
and productivity state s in period t. Denote the set of all v with V , that of all s with S, and
the V × S state space with Σ. Then µt(Σ) is a measure of the total size of the industry. The
distribution µt(·) is common knowledge.
Since all units with the same v are independently aﬀected by the same stochastic process, this
number of units is large, and there is no aggregate uncertainty, the evolution of the cross-sectional
distribution can be characterized by the underlying probability distribution, and aggregate vari-
ables follow a deterministic path given an initial distribution of ﬁrms.7 With respect to the
ﬁrm distribution µ(·) this means that although the identity of ﬁrms with any s is random, their
measure is deterministic. In a stationary equilibrium as focussed on here, aggregate variables
are constant, so the time subscript can be dropped.
2.2 Firm behavior
Firms’ individual state variables are v and s; they have a static control n and dynamic controls
that consist of the entry and exit decisions and choice of technology. They take three types
of decisions: Potential ﬁrms decide whether to enter, incumbents decide whether to exit, and
active ﬁrms maximize current proﬁts.
The incumbent’s problem: The problem for an active ﬁrm is to maximize current proﬁts.
By the properties of f, this yields the ﬁrm’s labor demand function n(si,ω). It is continuous,
increasing in s, and decreasing in the wage ω. The employment choice uniquely determines ﬁrm
output q and proﬁts π, which are strictly increasing in v and in s, and strictly decreasing in ω.





7Formally, this follows from the Glivenko-Cantelli Theorem (see e.g. Billingsley 1986). For a more thorough
discussion, see Feldman and Gilles (1985) and Judd (1985).
8and similarly aggregate output. Since all the ﬁrm labor demand curves are decreasing in the
wage, this is the case for aggregate labor demand, too. In addition, for given µ(·), aggregate
labor demand N and output Y are uniquely determined as functions of the wage. So for any
ﬁrm distribution µ(·), imposing labor market clearing implies a unique wage. In the following,
for brevity, decisions of the ﬁrm can then be written as functions of the wage only, although
fundamentally, they depend on the whole ﬁrm distribution.
Discounting proﬁts by a common discount factor β ∈ (0,1), the value of an incumbent is
W(vi,si,ω) = π(si,ω) + max





where primes denote next-period values. The max operator indicates a ﬁrm’s option to exit if
staying has negative expected value. By standard arguments, a unique value function exists,
is continuously diﬀerentiable in v, strictly increasing in v and s, and strictly decreasing in the
wage. (See also Lemma 1 and Corollary 2 in the Appendix.)
Exit: A ﬁrm exits when the expected value from continuing is smaller than the value of exiting
Wx: E[W(vi,s0
i,ω)|si] < Wx. With W strictly increasing in s, for given v and ω, this is the case
for s strictly smaller than some unique exit trigger sx(vi,ω) given by
E[W(vi,s0
i,ω)|sx] = 0 (5)
that is strictly decreasing in vi and increasing in ω. Firms with more productive technologies
can endure lower levels of the productivity shock before being forced to exit, whereas higher
wages decrease ﬁrm value and therefore raise sx. From Assumption 2, Gv(sx|s) > 0 for all v
and s, so there always is a strictly positive measure of ﬁrms that exit.
Entry and Technology Choice: Entrants compare costs and beneﬁts of entry, and choose
vi to maximize the expected net present value of entry. Beneﬁts correspond to the expected
value of a ﬁrm with technology vi, costs are given by the entry investment ce(vi). The net value




i,ω)|vi] − ce(vi)}, (6)
where the expectation is over the initial draw of s0 conditional on the v chosen.






i ]/∂vi = ce0(v∗
i ). (7)
Since the solution v∗
i to (7) is a function of the aggregate variable ω only, all entrants in a given
period adopt the same technology, so the i subscript on v∗(ω) can be dropped. At the same
time, under free entry, entry occurs (M(v∗) > 0) until
E[W(v∗,s0
i,ω)|v∗] = ce(v∗) (8)
in equilibrium. This also implies that the value of exit Wx is zero – starting a new ﬁrm after exit
will yield zero net value. Since a strictly positive measure of ﬁrms exits every period, M(v∗) also
must be strictly positive for the ﬁrm productivity distribution to be stationary, as considered in
the following. Equation (8) hence holds with equality. The wage adjusts to ensure this, and is
thus determined at the extensive margin. The solution to the system of (7) and (8) then is a
pair (v∗,ω∗) ∈ R2
+.
Cross-sectional distribution: Firms’ choices determine the cross-sectional distribution of




(1 − δ)µ(v,u) gv(s|u) du + M(v) hv(s) for any(v,s). (9)
The integral captures the evolution of continuing ﬁrms, while the last term accounts for entry.
3 Stationary Equilibrium
In this section, a stationary equilibrium is deﬁned, its determination is sketched, and an algo-
rithm for ﬁnding it is given. More detailed proofs are provided in the Appendix. Note that
this is the equilibrium of an industry. It can also be interpreted as general equilibrium of an
economy with consumer preferences that are linear in consumption.
Deﬁne a stationary competitive equilibrium as real numbers v∗,ω∗,M∗,s∗
x,N∗, and functions
µ∗(v,s),W(v,s,ω∗) such that:
(i) entry is optimal: v∗ and ω∗ satisfy (7) and (8) if M∗ > 0, and E[W(v,s0
i,ω)|v] < ce(v) for
all v otherwise;
8Lemma 5 in the Appendix shows that the expected value of entry is diﬀerentiable in v and that the problem
is concave, so the ﬁrst order condition is suﬃcient for an optimum.
10(ii) exit is optimal: s∗
x satisﬁes (5);
(iii) ﬁrm value W(v,s,ω) is given by (4) for all v, s, ω;
(iv) markets clear: ¯ N = N∗ = N(µ∗,ω∗); and
(v) the ﬁrm distribution is stationary: µ0 = µ = µ∗ from (9) given M∗, s∗
x and v∗.
The restriction to stationary equilibria does not allow considering dynamic changes of the
distribution. However, it does allow the analysis of processes within the distribution and the
comparison of stationary equilibria (as in the comparative dynamics exercise to follow), which
is suﬃcient for obtaining interesting results.
Existence of a competitive equilibrium intuitively follows from the following argument.9 It
has been shown in several contexts, starting with Lucas and Prescott (1971), that equilibria in
similar models of industry evolution maximize net discounted surplus in the industry.10 This
objective is continuous. It is bounded above under the assumption that very advanced tech-
nologies are prohibitively costly, i.e. the net value of entry goes to minus inﬁnity as v goes to
inﬁnity, since then equilibrium v∗ is ﬁnite. Hence, without loss of generality, the domain of
(v∗,M∗) can be restricted to a compact subset X of R2. The feasible set then is the set of all
(v∗,M∗) such that equilibrium conditions (i) to (v) hold. Finding a competitive equilibrium
then corresponds to maximizing a bounded and continuous objective on the compact set X.
By Weierstrass’s Theorem, an allocation that maximizes net discounted surplus, and hence a
competitive equilibrium, exist.
Intuitively, equilibrium can be imagined as follows. Figure 1 shows the cost and value of
entry around the equilibrium as functions of v. Equations (7) and (8) jointly determine the
optimal technology v∗ and the equilibrium wage ω∗. By optimality condition (7), the slopes
of the two curves have to be equal in equilibrium. Under the assumptions imposed on ce(v),
this occurs for a ﬁnite v∗. Proposition 7 in the Appendix shows that it is also unique. “Very
advanced” here need not be deﬁned too precisely, the empirical justiﬁcation being that only
ﬁnite productivity has been observed in reality. The economic mechanism for the determination
of (v∗,ω∗) is as follows. If the value of entry exceeds the cost of entry at any v, there is excess
demand for entry, driving the wage up until the net value of entry is zero. If the cost of entry
exceeds its value at all v, and there is exit, then the wage needs to drop to clear the labor market.
9This argument has already been outlined by Hopenhayn (1992) in a very similar context.
10This can be measured as consumer surplus minus costs of production. Since there are no distortions in the
model, the Welfare Theorems apply.
11In this way, v and the wage adjust until there is equilibrium entry, i.e. there is a pair (v∗,ω∗)
where the value of entry schedule is tangent to the entry cost curve, whereas it lies below it for
all other v. The analysis of comparative dynamics will be conducted in this framework.
A crucial intermediate result to be used for evaluating the impact of administrative entry
cost is that the derivative of the value of entry with respect to the technology v is negatively
related to the wage. This is shown in Lemma 6 in the Appendix. Intuitively, ﬁrm value rises in
v, but an increase in the wage shortens expected ﬁrm lifetime and thereby the beneﬁts from a
higher v, reducing Wv.
For illustration, Figure 2 shows the benchmark ﬁrm distribution resulting from the calibra-
tion in the next section, with productivity relative to average productivity on the x-axis. The
mode lies at 0.68; the distribution is heavily skewed to the right because of exit. The exit
threshold lies at 0.31. This means that in their year of exit, exiting ﬁrms are only about a third
as productive as the average ﬁrm.
Using the equilibrium conditions, a stationary equilibrium can be found by applying an algo-
rithm that consists of the following steps. First, obtain the ﬁrm labor demand functions n(si,ω).
Then, obtain expressions for ﬁrm value W(vi,si,ω) and for the exit trigger sx(vi,ω) (equilibrium
condition (ii)). In the numerical implementation, this is done by value function iteration, dis-
cretizing the state space S into a grid of 800 points. The boundaries of the grid inﬂuence results
if set too narrowly. Therefore, they are expanded until results are not aﬀected anymore. Using
the exit condition (5), a ﬁrm productivity transition matrix Px incorporating exit follows from
this. The equilibrium pair (v∗,ω∗) satisﬁes the two equilibrium conditions (7) and (8); it can be
obtained by only a few iterations on these two equations. Then the stationary ﬁrm distribution
(equilibrium condition (v)) is given up to a multiplicative constant corresponding to the number
of ﬁrms by the ergodic distribution µ = (I − PT
x )−1µ0 of a stochastic process with transition
matrix Px and initial state µ0, where µ0 is a vector capturing the distribution of entrants over
S, I is the identity matrix, and the superscript T denotes the transpose of a matrix. Finally,
equating labor demand and supply (equilibrium condition (iv)) yields the number of ﬁrms.
4 Benchmark economy
In this section, functional forms and parameters are chosen to ﬁt the US business sector. Given
these choices, model quantities resulting from calibration then uniquely determine the param-
eters of the entry cost function via the optimal v condition (7) and the free entry condition
(8).
12The production function has to satisfy Assumption 1. A natural choice for its functional form
is f(s,n) = esnα, 0 < α < 1,. In particular, it ensures decreasing returns at the ﬁrm level and
therefore well-deﬁned ﬁrm size, since α < 1. For the entry investment, only one value is observed
in a stationary equilibrium. This is because all ﬁrms choose the same technology v∗, as shown
before. However, an entry investment cost function needs to be speciﬁed for evaluating the
impact of an increase in administrative entry cost. This problem can be solved in a simple way.
It is suﬃcient to calibrate only one value ce ≡ ce(v∗) of the entry investment function. v∗ can be
normalized to unity for the benchmark economy because it just scales the level of productivity
and output of the economy, but does not inﬂuence the shape of the productivity distribution
or any ratios. Then choosing the simple functional form ce(v) = k1ek2v, k1 > 0, k2 > 1 for the
entry investment cost function implies that the parameters k1 and k2 are pinned down by the
equilibrium conditions (7) and (8) as k2 = Wv(v∗,ω∗)/W(v∗,ω∗) and k1 = W(v∗,ω∗)e−k2v∗
.11
To ensure comparability with statistics from ﬁrm-level data, the time period is set to one
year. As conventional in the literature, labor’s share of revenue α is set to 0.64. To match
a real annual interest rate of 4%, β is set to 0.96. The remaining parameters ρ,σ2,δ, ¯ s0,σ2
e,
and the ratio of the equilibrium entry investment ce to the ﬁxed operating cost cf together
determine the shape, location and truncation point of the ﬁrm productivity distribution. Since
these parameters have interacting eﬀects, they cannot be calibrated individually. Instead, they
are calibrated jointly to ﬁt a set of data moments of equal size. This ﬁt is very nonlinear in
the parameters; so a genetic algorithm following Dorsey and Mayer (1995) is used to ﬁnd the
best ﬁt. Given these parameters, the levels of ce and cf determine the number and size of ﬁrms.
They are ﬁxed to match the average ﬁrm size of 26.4 reported by Bartelsman, Scarpetta and
Schivardi (2003) (BSS) for US the US business sector.12
The following static and dynamic characteristics of the ﬁrm distribution are chosen as targets:
the ﬁrm turnover rate, the productivity of ﬁrms that entered within the last 10 periods relative
to the average ﬁrm, their productivity relative to exiting ﬁrms, the proportion of ﬁrms below
average productivity, the relative size of entrants, and their probability of still being active four
years after entry. The measures of the relative productivity of entrants allow anchoring the mean
of entrants’ productivity distribution. Given the functional form of the production function and
the choice of α close to a third, their relative size is quite a diﬀerent target. It is close to
11Due to the local nature of the calibration, these values are valid only locally, allowing experiments where v
∗
does not change much.
12Using data of the US Small Business Administration (SBA) on ﬁrm size distributions (available on
http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/data.html) yields a similar result.
13the relative skewness of the two distributions. Similarly, the proportion of ﬁrms below average
productivity says something about the skewness of the distribution of active ﬁrms. Finally, the
overall turnover rate and entrants’ survival rate mainly help calibrate the entry investment, the
ﬁxed cost, and the exogenous breakdown rate. To evaluate the calibration, the investment rate,
the productivity spread between the 85th and 15th percentile of the productivity distribution,
the employment-weighted ﬁrm turnover rate, and the fraction of entrants that exit after only
one period of operation are used. Moreover, the implied exit hazard can be compared to the
data.
Bartelsman et al. (2004) (BHS) report average yearly ﬁrm turnover of 22% for the US for
the 1990ies. This is higher than older estimates, e.g. from Cable and Schwalbach (1991), yet
ﬁrm turnover has been rising in almost all countries on which there is data, probably due to
deregulation. These and other sources also ﬁnd that other developed countries tend to have
slightly lower turnover rates. Estimates of entrants’ relative productivity agree that both in
Census of Manufactures (Foster et al. 2001) and in LRD (Haltiwanger 1997) data, the mean of
the distribution of entrants’ productivity is on average slightly below that for incumbents, while
Baily, Hulten and Campbell (1992) and Bartelsman and Dhrymes (1998) both show that the
variance of the distribution is high. Employing a variety of measures, Foster et al. (2001) settle
on a value of around 99% for average productivity of ﬁrms that entered over the last 10 years
relative to that of incumbents. They also report that these ﬁrms are 13% more productive than
exiting ﬁrms. The relative size of entrants (in terms of employment) is 28% according to BSS,
and their probability of still being active four years after entry is 63% according to BHS. Finally,
the ﬁrm productivity distribution is very skewed, 88% of ﬁrms have below average productivity.
Table 2: Parameter assignments
standard ﬁrm dynamics
α 0.64 ρ 0.94





ce(v) Costs in benchmark economy
(% of avg ﬁrm output)
k1 4.38e-22 Fixed cost 9.8%
k2 69.3 Entry cost 123%
14Table 3: Benchmark economy versus target statistics
data (US) model
Firm turnover rate 22% 22.7%
Average ﬁrm size 24.6 26.4
TFP entrants/incumbents 99% 99.5%
TFP entrants/exiter 113% 105.2%
Relative size of entrants 28% 28.4%
Four-year survival rate of entrants 63% 62.3%
Firms below average TFP 88% 85.8%
other statistics:
Investment rate 14.4% 14.0%
Productivity spread 3-4 3.88
Employment-weighted ﬁrm turnover rate 7% 8.3%
Fraction one-year ﬁrms 23% 24.5%
Finally adopted parameters are shown in Table 2. Target statistics are summarized in the left
and resulting statistics for the model economy in the right column of Table 3. The calibration
ﬁts target moments quite closely. Only the productivity of entrants relative to exiting ﬁrms is
slightly on the low side.
The adopted parameter values are also reasonable. As generally found in the empirical
literature, ﬁrm productivity is very persistent, as indicated here by a ρ of 0.94. The consensus
in the literature does not specify what “very persistent” means. On the one hand, Campbell
(1998) uses a random walk, and Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) ﬁnd a 5-year autocorrelation
coeﬃcient of 0.93 in a panel of ﬁrms from the LRD, both implying more persistence than the
value used here. On the other hand, empirical studies using state of the art dynamic panel
methods (e.g. Blundell and Bond 1999) tend to ﬁnd lower coeﬃcients than these two papers.
Dwyer (1996) explores the topic in detail for one industry and shows that the productivity
process at the ﬁrm level is not easy to extract from a panel. In this sense, a ρ of 0.94 certainly
is in the right ballpark. There is not much direct evidence on what values σ2 should take
on. For example, Cooper and Haltiwanger (2002) ﬁnd a variance of the idiosyncratic shock of
0.0785 in a balanced panel, i.e. conditional on ﬁrms surviving the whole 17 years of their sample.
Since not taking into account exit drives down the estimate of the variance, the unconditional
variance must be higher. So the value of 0.3 used here is plausible. The variance of entrant’s
productivity in the ﬁrst period is more than twice that of incumbents. Other papers such as
Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) that adopt a uniform distribution of entrants’ productivity
15do not report a comparable statistic. However, the model implies that, although there are less
entrants in higher productivity deciles, the distribution of entrants over productivity deciles is
reasonably ﬂat, and entrants enter all deciles (see Figure 3). This ﬁts the data well. Overall,
adopted parameter values thus seem reasonable.
Calibrated values for the parameters of the entry investment function, k1 and k2, are hard
to interpret by themselves. However, the implied entry investment of 1.23 times average ﬁrm
output seems reasonable, just as ﬁxed operating costs of 10% of average ﬁrm output. In line
with this, the investment rate, measured as the entry cost of new ﬁrms in a period divided by
aggregate output, comes close to its empirical counterpart. This is despite the restriction to
investment only upon entry, and although it was not targeted in the calibration.
Other quantities that have not been targeted also ﬁt rather well. The employment-weighted
ﬁrm turnover rate of 8.3% is quite close to the data value of 7%. The fraction of ﬁrms exiting
after only one year also ﬁts the data well. Finally, the productivity spread between the 85th
and the 15th decile, although possibly a bit high at 3.88, ﬁts well with reported values of 3 to
4 (see e.g. Dhrymes 1991, Dwyer 1996). Hence, the calibration ﬁts well in both the targeted
dimensions and in supplementary ones.
Next, it would be desirable to compare the exit hazard (Figure 4) implied by ﬁrms’ life cycles
in the model to that in the data. Unfortunately, reported series of this variable are usually too
short or presented in such a way as not to be directly comparable with the measures obtained
here.13 However, the model clearly matches the empirical pattern that exit hazards decline in
size and in age. The same holds true for the growth rate of surviving entrants (Figure 6). It
is close to the doubling of employment by surviving entrants within a few years reported by
BSS.To summarize, given that the model is very parsimonious and only few parameters have
been calibrated, the calibration ﬁts rather well. The next section explores the eﬀect of adding
administrative entry costs on aggregate productivity .
5 The eﬀect of administrative entry cost
As illustrated in the introduction (see Table 1), the US has higher per capita output than other
OECD members despite a lower capital-output ratio. This still holds when taking into account
diﬀerences in human capital and in hours worked. Usually, this is “explained” by its higher TFP.
This section explores how the present model can generate part of these diﬀerences. To ﬁx ideas,
13Both remarks apply to the hazards reported by BSS. For example, they exclude ﬁrms that live only one year
although there are many of them in the data.
16think in terms of a comparison of the US and Germany, using data on aggregates from the Penn
World Tables for 1988 (Summers and Heston 1991). (Hence the comparison is not aﬀected by
German reuniﬁcation.) For that year, and similarly in other periods, the German capital-output
ratio is 25% higher than that of the US, while output per worker is 18.2% lower. Human capital
per worker is also 19.8% lower, so this explains only part of the gap. Using a capital share
of one third, a growth accounting exercise yields German TFP of 8.8% less than that of the
US (Hall and Jones 1999). While many factors could be used to explain this discrepancy, the
scope of this section is to illustrate how the present model can resolve some of it. In passing,
it also generates a lower ﬁrm turnover rate (13% in Germany). Although it is well-known that
higher entry cost is associated with higher capital-output ratios when comparing industries,14
cross-country studies have not yet addressed this connection. Moreover, even the cross-industry
literature usually focusses on the eﬀect of capital intensity on subsequent entry without taking
into account its endogeneity.
In an inﬂuential article, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) publish
meticulously gathered data on administrative entry barriers in 85 countries. They describe
the minimum cost needed to meet oﬃcial requirements to legally operate a small industrial or
commercial ﬁrm. This ﬁts with the characteristics of entrants in the benchmark economy. The
cost corresponds to 47% of per capita output in the average country, close to zero (0.5%) in
the country with the lowest cost (United States), and 463% in the country with the highest
cost (Dominican Republic). In Germany, it is 32.5%, close to the values for other continental
European OECD members. Djankov et al. also relate these costs to other variables such as
measures of corruption and conclude in favor of the public choice view that entry regulation
beneﬁts politicians and bureaucrats without necessarily increasing welfare. Yet more can be
said. The consequences of entry regulation do not stop at its direct cost; through its eﬀect on
entry, technology choice, and aggregate productivity, the cost in terms of lost output can be
several times the direct cost.
This section explores the consequence of imposing an additional entry cost of 30% of per
capita output on entrants, regardless of the v chosen. This amounts to an upward shift of ce(v)
by 1.1% (9.5%) of the output of the average (median) ﬁrm, or by 0.9% of the entry investment
in the benchmark economy. Since this change is small, the parameters of the entry investment
cost function imputed in the calibration can be used to ﬁnd the new stationary equilibrium with
this additional cost.
14For a survey, see Roberts and Tybout (1996).
17From an economic point of view, the following channels are at work (for an illustration, see
Figure 7): Start in a stationary equilibrium with technology v∗ and wage ω∗. The administrative
entry barrier then uniformly increases the cost of the entry investment for all technologies v.
It thus corresponds to an upward shift of the entry investment cost function ce(v). At the old
wage, this would make entry unproﬁtable for all v. Since exit continues, labor demand would
fall. To reequilibrate the labor market, the new equilibrium wage has to be lower, such that
there is entry again. Because the wage is negatively related to the derivative of the value of
entry with respect to v (Lemma 6), this fall in ω raises the slope of the value of entry schedule
at every v. Together with the condition in Proposition 7 that the net value of entry goes to zero
as v goes to inﬁnity, i.e. ce(·) rises faster than the value of entry schedule, this implies that the
new equilbrium technology v∗ has to lie to the right of the old one. Intuitively, the marginal
cost of adopting a better technology has remained constant, while the fall in the wage increases
the marginal beneﬁts of doing so, implying a higher v∗ in the new equilibrium. Hence, the new
equilibrium features a higher entry investment, net of the administrative cost, and a lower wage.
Aggregating the entry investment over ﬁrms, this implies a larger capital stock. At the same
time, output falls slightly because a distortion has been introduced. Hence, the capital-output
ratio rises. With output per capita lower, and investment higher, it is also clear that TFP must
be lower. Finally, ﬁrm turnover falls due to the higher entry investment and because the higher
v and the lower wage depress the exit threshold.
Numerical results (Table 4) show that some of these eﬀects are sizeable. While the ﬁrm
turnover rate drops only slightly, the entry investment and thereby the capital-output ratio
increase signiﬁcantly. Welfare eﬀects are strong, too; the loss in consumption is several times
the direct burden imposed by the administrative cost. Per capita output falls despite the increase
in v. Theoretically, this is not surprising, since the administrative entry cost acts as a distortion
that should lower welfare. More concretely, there are two eﬀects counteracting the eﬀect of the
increase in v. First, the productivity diﬀerence between entering and exiting ﬁrms increases by
almost as much as the equilibrium technology. This implies that the rise in v does not translate
into an improvement of the whole ﬁrm distribution; the lower tail, protected by the higher
equilibrium entry investment, does not shift up. Secondly, due to the higher equilibrium entry
investment, there are less ﬁrms, with higher employment on average. With decreasing returns to
scale at the ﬁrm level, this reduces output per worker. These two negative eﬀects taken together
dominate the positive eﬀect of the increase in v. Due to the higher entry investment, TFP falls
by even more than output per worker.
18Table 4: Eﬀects of introducing administrative entry cost of 30% of per capita output (benchmark
economy = 100)









Firm turnover rate 99.15
Average ﬁrm size 100.47
number of ﬁrms 99.54
TFP entrants/incumbents 100
TFP entrants/exiter 100.05
Relative size of entrants 100.32
Four-year survival rate of entrants 100.70
Firms below average TFP 100.08
Comparing Germany and the US, the reaction of the capital-output ratio, output per worker,
TFP, the relative size of entrants, and entrants’ survival rate all quantitatively ﬁt the evidence.
Only the increase in average ﬁrm size does not ﬁt observed patterns. However, average ﬁrm size
in the US is far higher than in most other countries, which is probably due to eﬀects of market
size and geography that are not captured here. Quantitatively, the change in the capital-output
ratio represents around one ﬁfth and that in TFP around one tenth of the diﬀerences in the
two variables between Germany and the US. Hence, the model helps explain a non-negligible
portion of diﬀerences in the capital-output ratio and in TFP by taking into account the eﬀect
of a small, but well-measured diﬀerence between the two countries.
For intuition, the result can be interpreted as an endogenous, equilibrium ampliﬁcation of
entry barriers. High capital-output ratios are often interpreted as such at the industry level.
They also act in this way in the model; a higher equilibrium entry investment discourages
entry and protects low-productivity ﬁrms. What is novel is that they arise endogenously as an
equilibrium outcome in a competitive industry, in response to just a small shift in entry costs,
and without strategic interaction.
195.1 Both heterogeneity and technology choice matter
The model used here diﬀers from most other macroeconomic models in two dimensions, the
heterogeneity of ﬁrms and technology choice upon entry. Table 5 shows that both of these are
necessary for obtaining the results on the capital-output ratio and TFP.
With a ﬁxed technology v as in the original Hopenhayn (1992) model, an increase in ad-
ministrative entry cost can only have a direct eﬀect. The indirect eﬀect through an equilibrium
adjustment of ﬁrms’ entry investment is ruled out by assumption. As a result, entry barriers
change little. Moreover, only the wage and the number of ﬁrms can adjust. Table 5 shows
that aggregate output drops; it falls a bit more than with optimal choice of v because ﬁxing v
means shutting down one margin of optimization. The consumption loss does not exceed the
direct burden of the administrative cost much. Aggregate productivity falls only very little.
The capital-output ratio falls slightly because the number of ﬁrms declines more than output.
It cannot change much more, with v ﬁxed. Turnover does not change much either. Hence, the
model with ﬁxed technology both has a smaller response of productivity to the rise in entry cost
and barely generates movements of the capital-output ratio and the turnover rate that ﬁt the
patterns shown in Table 1.
Similar remarks apply to a model with technology choice, but homogeneous ﬁrms. (The
homogeneous ﬁrm model used here is described in detail in the appendix.) Turnover is exoge-
nously ﬁxed by construction (by imposing an exogenous exit probability of 11% for all ﬁrms).
The same holds for all measures related to the ﬁrm distribution, which is degenerate here. More
importantly, technology choice reacts far less to the rise in entry cost. The reason is that with
stochastic productivity s, i.e. heterogeneous ﬁrms, ﬁrm value is convex in s. Due to Jensen’s
inequality, the expectation of the value of the ﬁrm is then higher than the value at the expected
s. Since expected s increases in the technology chosen at entry, ﬁrms are prepared to pay higher
entry costs when productivity is stochastic. This also means that they react more to changes in
entry cost. In economic terms: Even if the average entrant has below-average productivity and
a large initial exit hazard, there is a small probability that the ﬁrm will become very eﬃcient
and make large proﬁts. This warrants paying even a large entry cost. This eﬀect is absent
from homogeneous-ﬁrm models, causing them to underestimate willingness to pay for entry. So
a heterogeneous-ﬁrm model shows much better why ﬁrms enter even if entry cost is high and
probability of success low, as often observed in the literature on entry (see e.g. Geroski 1995).
As a result, in the homogeneous ﬁrm model, aggregate productivity (TFP) falls only slightly.
The rise in eﬃciency of the technology is more than compensated by the increase in spending
20Table 5: Eﬀects of introducing administrative entry cost of 30% of per capita output, 3 speciﬁ-
cations (respective benchmark economy = 100)
optimal v ﬁxed v homogeneous ﬁrms
Equilibrium technology v∗ 100.07 100.00 100.00
Wage ω∗ 99.66 99.65 99.75
Entry investment 105.54 100.00 100.92
Aggregate output 99.8 99.65 99.74
Capital-output ratio 105.4 99.39 100.00
Aggregate TFP 98.98 99.67 99.51
Consumption 98.9 99.68 99.80
Consumption loss 6.85 1.92 1.12
/exogenous cost increase
Firm turnover rate 99.15 100.00 exog.
Average ﬁrm size 100.47 100.97 101.17
number of ﬁrms 99.54 99.04 98.84
TFP entrants/incumbents 100.00 100.00 100.00
TFP entrants/exiter 100.05 100.00 100.00
Relative size of entrants 100.32 100.00 100.00
Four-year survival rate of entrants 100.70 99.46 exog.
Firms below average TFP 100.08 100.00 100.00
on it. The fall is smaller than with heterogeneous ﬁrms also because the eﬀect of protection for
unproductive ﬁrms due to the higher entry investment is absent here.
To summarize, considering slight shifts in entry cost, as caused by administrative entry
costs, in conjunction with technology choice by ﬁrms and idiosyncratic shocks, allows to explain
10 to 20% of observed diﬀerences in TFP and capital-output ratios and a small proportion of
diﬀerences in ﬁrm turnover and output per worker between similar countries such as European
Union member states and the US. These eﬀects arise because a smaller number of ﬁrms, higher
average ﬁrm size, and the protection of less eﬃcient ﬁrms due to the higher equilibrium entry
investment dominate the eﬀect of choosing a more eﬃcient technology. For this result, both
heterogeneity of ﬁrms and technology choice are crucial elements.
6 Conclusion and Directions for Further Research
Diﬀerences in total factor productivity are a puzzle, particularly between similarly developed
countries. This paper has analyzed the eﬀect of small shifts in entry cost in a dynamic stochas-
tic model of heterogeneous ﬁrms with technology adoption. Results ﬁt the observed patterns
21qualitatively, and correspond to 10 to 20% of observed diﬀerences: a country with lower entry
cost has higher productivity and output despite lower capital intensity, and it has higher ﬁrm
turnover. Notably, the consumption loss caused by increasing administrative entry cost is a
multiple of the direct burden of the regulation. Via technology choice, the administrative cost
encourages endogenous formation of entry barriers in the form of high capital intensity. These
results are relevant for ongoing discussions in Europe about a productivity gap compared to the
US, particularly with regard to the role of regulation.
The model proposed here diﬀers from other models of industry evolution by allowing entrants
to choose technology, modeled as a parameter aﬀecting their expected productivity after entry
and over their life. To be able to conduct the analysis of changes in entry cost, an algorithm
for ﬁnding a stationary equilibrium with positive entry and exit was presented. By calibrating
the model, I have obtained parameters of the entry cost function needed for the comparative
dynamics exercises leading to above-mentioned results.
The present approach ﬁts in both with the recent theoretical (e.g. Veracierto 2003, Samaniego
2005) and empirical (see fn. 1) literature on heterogeneous ﬁrms and productivity outcomes, and
with the literature on (de)regulation and productivity (see e.g. Blanchard and Giavazzi 2003).
These works suggest that considering the heterogeneity of ﬁrms should oﬀer many more oppor-
tunities for interesting future research.
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A Formal Statements of Results and Proofs
A ﬁrm’s individual state variables are v and s; the aggregate state is completely described by
µ(·). However, the aggregate state that is relevant for ﬁrm decisions is the wage ω. Therefore,
to describe the ﬁrm’s actions, it is suﬃcient to consider instead of µ (with domain Σ = V ×
S) only a reduced aggregate state space Ω of positive, ﬁnite ω. This is suﬃcient because ω
is uniquely determined by µ (from equation (3)). The total state space the ﬁrm considers
(including individual and aggregate state variables) then is Z = V × S × Ω. Since it results
below (Proposition 7) that the optimal v is always ﬁnite, Z can be taken to be a compact subset
of R3.
Then, for any point of the state space, a ﬁrm’s labor demand, output and proﬁts, and
aggregate labor demand and output can be obtained by static optimization. Firm value then is




π(s,ω) + (1 − x)β [EsW(v,s0,ω)|s]
	
, (10)
where x is the value taken on by the exit policy function X(v,s,ω) (x = 1 means exit), and π(·)
is the proﬁt function resulting from static optimization.
Lemma 1 For v∗ ﬁnite, there is a unique ﬁrm value function W that satisﬁes (10). The exit
policy function X is single-valued and lets ﬁrms attain the supremum in (10).
Proof. Proof is by applying Theorem 9.12 from Stokey and Lucas (1989). Assumption 9.1
trivially holds. Since the expectation of s is ﬁnite and v∗ is assumed ﬁnite, total returns are
bounded, and Assumption 9.2 holds. Conditions (a) and (b) of Theorem 9.12 are also fulﬁlled
if v∗ is ﬁnite. In Proposition 7 below it is veriﬁed that this is generally true when Assumption
4 holds.
Corollary 2 The ﬁrm value function W is continuous, strictly increasing in v and in s, and
strictly decreasing in ω. For given v, it is bounded.
This follows from the properties of the proﬁt function; by Theorems 9.7 and 9.11 in Stokey
and Lucas (1989) they carry over to the value function. Boundedness then follows from the fact
that E(s0|s) is well-deﬁned and ﬁnite for all s
Corollary 3 For cf > 0 and under Assumption 2, there is a unique exit trigger sx(v,ω) ≡
{s s.t.E[W(v,s0,ω)|s] = 0}. Hence, the exit policy function X is single-valued; it takes value 1
(exit) for s < sx and value 0 for s ≥ sx. The exit trigger sx(·) is strictly decreasing in v, strictly
increasing in ω, and continuous in both.
Proof. Firms exit whenever the expected value of continuing is smaller than the value of exiting:
E[W(v,s0,ω)|s] < 0, (11)
where the value of exit is zero due to the zero net value of entry condition (8). Since E(s0|s)
increases in s by Assumption 2, and because ﬁrm value increases in s by Corollary 2, the left-
hand side (LHS) of (11) is strictly increasing in s. Moreover, given any cf > 0, there is an s
26so low that expected value of continuing is negative, and an s so high that it is positive. Then
there is a unique sx such that an equality replaces the inequality in (11). Firms exit whenever
s < sx. The properties of sx follow from the properties of the value function.
To ensure that the condition for optimal technology choice (7) is well-deﬁned, it is necessary
to show that the value function is diﬀerentiable with respect to v. For this, it ﬁrst has to be
shown that expected ﬁrm life is ﬁnite. This is also crucial for a stationary equilibrium.
Lemma 4 Given the speciﬁcation of the stochastic process for s in (2), the lifetime T of a ﬁrm
is ﬁnite for all v with probability 1. It has a well-deﬁned pre-entry expectation ¯ T that is the same
for all ﬁrms.
Proof. Proof is easiest by reasoning in terms of the properties of Markov processes. Deﬁne the
set Sx = {s ∈ S : s < sx}. Once a ﬁrm draws an s ∈ Sx, it exits, so Sx is an ergodic set. Because
 has positive variance, there are s ≥ sx such that Gv(sx|s) > 0, i.e. with a positive probability
of exiting in the next period. Hence, the set {s ∈ S : s ≥ sx} is transient. Then, by Theorem 5.6
in Doob (1953), s can remain outside Sx for a ﬁnite time only with probability 1. Moreover, the
probability of remaining in the transient set decreases at a geometric rate. As a consequence,
expected ﬁrm life is ﬁnite with probability 1. This implies that it has a well-deﬁned expectation
¯ T. As all ﬁrms have the same v, it is the same for all ﬁrms.
Lemma 5 If v∗ is ﬁnite, Assumption 4 holds, and very advanced technologies are prohibitively
costly, i.e. limv→∞ce(v)−E[W(v,s0,ω)|v] = ∞, then the expected value of entry We is contin-
uously diﬀerentiable in v in a neighborhood of v∗, with We
v > 0 for all v.
Proof. In any period, the probability of surviving beyond the following period is given by the
probability 1 − Gv(sx(v,ω)|s) of drawing an s0 > sx(v,ω) next period. Firm value can then be
expressed as a sum of proﬁts, weighted by conditional survival probabilities. This sum has a
ﬁnite number of bounded elements because ﬁrm lifetime is ﬁnite with probability 1 by Lemma
4. Value of a ﬁrm given a current productivity s0 ≥ sx(v,ω) then is
W(v,s0,ω) = π(s0,ω) + βE[π(s1,ω)|s0] +
T X
t=2
βtP{st−1 ≥ sx(v,ω)|s0}E[π(st,ω)|s0], (12)
and expected net value of entry is





Expected gross value of entry increases in v because the exit probability falls in v and because
higher v raises the probability of high draws of s0. Since expected lifetime is well-deﬁned and
ﬁnite, ce(v) can be decomposed into a sum of discounted, annualized payments, weighted by
survival probabilities. Expected net entry value then is the expectation of a weighted sum of net
period returns, i.e. proﬁts net of the entry investment. By the assumption that very advanced
technologies are prohibitively costly, by the fact that We is continuous and monotonically in-
creasing in v, and by limv→−∞ ce(v) > 0 > −cf = limv→−∞ We(v), both expected net value of
entry and these net period returns are concave in v. Then, expected value of entry is diﬀeren-
tiable with respect to v by Theorem 9.10 in Stokey and Lucas (1989). The derivative is positive
by Corollary 2. Moreover, the ﬁrm’s technology choice problem is concave, and the ﬁrst order
condition (7) is suﬃcient.
27For comparative statics, it is necessary to know how We
v and ω interact. Unfortunately,
general statements about second derivatives of value functions are hard to make, but the next
result establishes that We
v falls in the wage.
Lemma 6 We
v falls in ω.




hv(s0) W(v,s0,ω) ds0. (14)















Now consider an ω0 > ω. The second integral becomes smaller because W decreases in ω. The
ﬁrst integral is a weighted average of Wv for s0 ≥ sx(v,ω) (continue), which is positive, and for
s0 < sx(v,ω), which is zero. Increasing the wage puts more weight on the second term, hence
the ﬁrst integral decreases in ω, too. As a result, We
v falls in ω.
The central result for a unique equilibrium then is:
Proposition 7 Equilibrium condition (i) is fulﬁlled by a unique ﬁnite pair (v∗,ω∗) if very ad-
vanced technologies are prohibitively costly, i.e. limv→∞{ce(v) − E[W(v,s0,ω)|v]} = ∞.
Proof. Properties of the expected value of entry are closely related to incumbents’ value. By
Lemma 5 and Assumption 3, the expected value of entry is continuous, strictly increasing,
and diﬀerentiable in v, and continuous and strictly decreasing in ω. Hence, the LHS of (7) is
well-deﬁned.
Equilibrium existence has been shown in the main text. Finiteness of v∗ follows from the
prohibitive cost of very advanced technologies. Uniqueness of w∗ given v∗ follows from the
properties of the value of entry. Given v∗, the RHS of both (7) and (8) is constant; the LHS
is strictly decreasing in ω; ω∗ is the wage that solves both of them. Uniqueness of the (v∗,ω∗)
pair can be established by the following argument: Suppose that there are two optimal pairs
(v1,ω1) and (v2,ω2), with v1 < v2 and ω1 6= ω2. Each is then associated to a value function
E[W(v,s0,ωi)|v], i = 1,2. Inspection (in the framework of Figure 1) shows that these have
to cross. However, since expected entry value is strictly decreasing in ω, this is not possible:
changing ω shifts the value function, and value functions for diﬀerent wages do not cross. Hence,
the optimum pair (v∗,ω) is unique and ﬁnite. To rule out in general a continuum of pairs (v∗,ω∗)
with v∗ an interval and a unique ω∗, the assumption on the cost function would have to be
strengthened. This could be achieved for instance by assuming that the entry cost function is
“more convex” than the value function in the sense that if (7) holds at (˜ v,ω∗), the net value of
entry is negative for all v > ˜ v, given ω∗.
With an expression for the exit trigger, and v∗ and ω∗ consistent with positive entry in hand,
it remains to determine a ﬁrm distribution µ consistent with a stationary equilibrium. In this,
there are two crucial ingredients. First, as shown in the main text, all entrants in a given period
adopt the same technology. For a stationary equilibrium, clearly, this is be constant over time
so that we can ﬁx v at v∗ and consider µ(s). Second, there is a one-to-one mapping from the
exit trigger sx to entry mass M. This follows from the fact that with stationary µ(s), the total
measure of ﬁrms has to be constant, and hence the measure of exiting ﬁrms µ(s < sx) has to
28equal the measure of entering ﬁrms M. Since expected ﬁrm life is ﬁnite (Lemma 4), this can be





(1 − δ)µ(u) gv∗(s|u) du + M hv∗(s), (16)
i.e. a µ such that (Tµ)(s0) = µ(s0). Fixed-point arguments as given in Stokey and Lucas (1989)
do not apply easily in this case because, due to entry and exit, the transition function for µ(s) is
not monotone: Every period, low-productivity ﬁrms perish and are replaced by more productive
ones, with only the remaining ﬁrms’ productivity following a monotone process. However, the
conditions for the existence of a unique stationary equilibrium with positive entry and exit
derived in Hopenhayn (1992, equation (12)) carry over exactly to the present case. The result
that v∗ is ﬁnite and the assumption that the ﬁrm is a price taker in input markets are suﬃcient
for this.
B Homogeneous ﬁrm model
The production function is
yi = esinα = esnα, (17)

















Deﬁning the number of ﬁrms as B, aggregate output then is Y = By. Labour supply is ¯ N. The
















˜ α − cf, (21)




1−α > 0 and cf is the ﬁxed cost. With an exogenous exit probability of δ





where ρ = 1 − β(1 − δ). Firms choose s upon entry, at cost ce(s) = k1ek2s + k3. Both the entry
cost function and V are convex in s. The two central equilibrium conditions then are: Optimal





29where subscripts indicate derivatives, and the condition that net value of entry has to be zero
in equilibrium (NEC)
V (s) = ce(s). (24)
This system can be solved for optimal es and equilibrium ω, e.g. by substituting the FOC into

































aggregate output is Y = ¯ NαB1−αes.
To calibrate the model, set α,β to standard values 0.64 and 0.96, δ, ¯ N directly to desired
values 0.11 and 17mn (yielding 22% turnover rate of ﬁrms), and set k1,k2, and cf to match the
capital-output ratio and ﬁxed cost of the benchmark economy of the heterogeneous ﬁrm model. I
normalize s to have the same aggregate output in both models. Output in the heterogenous ﬁrm
model is Yhet = ¯ Nα(M¯ s)1−α, so to achieve the same level of output, the right standardization
is es
hom = ¯ s1−α. Then the wage follows from the target for n, which gives a relation between ce
and cf. Given the target for k/y = ce/y = ce
esnα, this ce is ﬁxed, so that cf can be inferred from
the previous relationship. With all this in hand, the value function of the ﬁrm can be calculated,
and k1 and k2 follow by using the value and the marginal value (wrt s) of entry at equilibrium.
The models diﬀer signiﬁcantly in the ce/cf ratio, which is lower in the homogeneous ﬁrm
case. In the heterogenous ﬁrm case, there is a small probability of becoming one of the most
productive ﬁrms, reaping large proﬁts. Technically, the value function is convex in s and v, so
E[V (s)] > V (E(s)) by Jensen’s inequality, so that idiosyncratic uncertainty increases the value
of entry and thus the willingness to bear entry cost. The case here is a bit more complicated
because in the benchmark calibration, ce/cf is lower in the homogeneous ﬁrm case not because
of lower ce, but because of cf. But this is also clear: In the heterogeneous ﬁrm model, ﬁxed
costs ensure exit. In the homogeneous ﬁrm case, exit is exogenous. Higher ﬁxed costs do
however have the eﬀect of decreasing the number of ﬁrms in the homogeneous ﬁrm case. This
has to happen because standardization is chosen such as to equalize output, and the skewed
distribution of output across ﬁrms in the heterogeneous ﬁrm case implies that more ﬁrms are
needed to produce the same output.





































Figure 1: The value function and the entry cost function around the optimum (v∗ = 1)





























Figure 2: The ﬁrm distribution in the benchmark economy
































Figure 3: Distribution of entrants over productivity deciles



















Figure 4: Exit hazard: probability of exiting conditional on being active x years after entry








































Figure 5: Proportion of ﬁrms surviving x years after entry










































Figure 6: Average size of entrants after x years of activity relative to size at entry























Old and New Equilibrium
Cost
Value
Figure 7: Upward shift in entry cost: old and new equilibrium
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